We study the agenda-setting political behavior of a large sample of U.S. newspapers during the last decade, and the behavior of smaller samples for longer time periods. Our purpose is to examine the intensity of coverage of economic issues as a function of the underlying economic conditions and the political a¢ liation of the incumbent president, focusing on unemployment, in ‡ation, the federal budget and the trade de…cit. We investigate whether there is any signi…cant correlation between the endorsement policy of newspapers, and the di¤erential coverage of bad/good economic news as a function of the president's political a¢ liation. We …nd evidence that newspapers with proDemocratic endorsement pattern systematically give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a Republican than when the president is Democratic, compared to newspapers with pro-Republican endorsement pattern. This result is not driven by the partisanship of readers. There is on the contrary no evidence of a partisan bias -or at least of a bias that is correlated with the endorsement policy -for stories on in ‡ation, budget de…cit or trade de…cit.
Introduction
News provided by the mass media are the most important source of information on public a¤airs in modern democratic societies. Hence, media outlets play a fundamental role in keeping the public informed on the decisions of their political representatives as well as on issues and events that are relevant to public decision-making. Time and space available being limited, journalists exercise a considerable degree of discretion on the topics covered and the tone of the reports. It would therefore not be surprising if the political views of individual journalists were re ‡ected in news reported in the mass media.
One of the most important claims about news in the mass media is the agenda-setting hypothesis. The idea is that editors and journalists have a large degree of freedom in deciding what is newsworthy and what is not, and these choices in ‡uence the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant and to what extent. Cohen [1963] stated it eloquently: the press "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."The exploitation of agenda-setting power is potentially one of the most harmful behaviors by news media, especially if they use this power to suppress information.
The reason is that it is di¢ cult for consumers to distinguish the scenario "I did not see any news about X today because nothing important happened regarding X" from the scenario "I did not see any news about X today because, although something important happened, the media decided not to publish it". Theoretical models by Anderson and McLaren [2005] , Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn [2006] , Besley and Prat [2006] and Puglisi [2004] incorporate precisely this source of media bias, and show how this can a¤ect public decisions and possibly lead to suboptimal ones.
In this paper we try to gauge the extent of agenda bias on economic issues for a large number of U.S. newspapers over the period 1996-2005. For newspapers belonging to chains or with large circulation we go back to 1988. Exploiting the NewsLibrary electronic archive, we collected monthly and quarterly data on the number of articles that each newspaper reported on some relevant economic issues. These data can be matched with the actual economic …gures to try to assess whether outlets systematically over-report or under-report on given issues as a function of those …gures and of the party a¢ liation of the incumbent president. For example, an outlet with a proDemocratic bias might devote more (less) space to news on unemployment when the president is Republican (Democrat) and unemployment is high or rising. We focus on the political a¢ liation of the incumbent president, because -as consistently shown by a large literature (see e.g. Fair [1978] , Tufte [1978] , Hibbs [1987] , Erikson [1989] ) -the performance of the economy under his mandate is a strong determinant of his (or his party's) vote during the next presidential elections. 1 Di¤erently from other studies on this topic, we do not make any claims about the absolute political bias of U.S. newspapers. Instead, we are interested in the political position of the newspapers relative to each other. In particular, our strategy consists in detecting agenda-setting behavior by exploiting prior knowledge on the political leaning of the newspapers. We investigate whether there is any cross-sectional correlation between the di¤erential coverage of economic issues -as a function of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent president -and more explicit measures of political orientation, in particular the endorsements of political candidates. In other terms, we want to see if the political orientation of newspapers "spills over"from the editorial page, where endorsements are explictly made, to the news section, where di¤erential coverage of the same economic …gures can then be interpreted as agenda setting.
We focus on four key economic variables: the unemployment rate, the in ‡ation rate, the federal de…cit, and the trade de…cit. These all represent "bads" · . The incumbent president might be blamed by the public for high values, or rewarded for low values. Hence, we check whether newspapers that have a higher propensity to endorse Democratic candidates give less coverage to a given economic issue when the incumbent president is a Democrat and the corresponding economic indicator is high and/or rising, compared to the coverage of newspapers that have a propensity to endorse Republicans. Formally, this amounts to using a regression speci…cation containing a three-way interaction term. Moreover, since we do not know whether levels or changes in the economic …gures are more newsworthy, we consider both speci…cations that focus on levels and speci…cations that consider changes.
We …nd fairly robust evidence of political partisanship in the coverage of the unemployment rate. We …nd that newspapers with a pro-Democratic endorsement pattern systematically publish fewer pieces about unemployment when the national unemployment rate is high and the president is 1 On this account, MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson [1992] posit an indirect mechanism of in ‡uence, whereas the state of the economy (in particular the unemployment rate and GDP growth) a¤ects the perceptions voters have about it, which in turn a¤ects the approval rate of the incumbent president and his vote percentage during the next elections. On the contrary, as discussed by Erikson [1990] , there is no robust evidence suggesting that the economy has any signi…cant e¤ects on congressional elections.
Democratic than when the national unemployment is equally high and the president is a Republican.
The size of the estimated e¤ects is not negligible. When the unemployment rate was one percentage point above the average, newspapers with a strong propensity to endorse Republican candidates reacted with 15% per month more articles under Clinton than under Bush. For the same one percent increase, newspapers with a strong pro-Democratic endorsement policy have 9% less news on unemployment under Clinton than under Bush. We …nd instead no evidence of partisan bias in the coverage on any of the other economic variables we consider.
Following a recent paper by Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] on the determinants of the ideological slant of the language used by U.S. newspapers, we also check whether the agenda bias found for unemployment coverage depends on demand, i.e. the partisanship of readers. While newspapers more heavily sold in Democratic areas indeed tend to give more coverage to high unemployment under Bush than under Clinton as compared to those sold in Republican areas, endorsement partisanship still matters, i.e. Democratic endorsing newspapers give more coverage to high unemployment under Bush than under Clinton as compared to Republican endorsing ones. This means that media bias is not just driven by demand factors.
A salient feature of our approach is that we code newspaper articles through an automatic keyword search, instead of a human-based content analysis. One advantage of this procedure is that, by de…nition, it is not intensive in the usage of human capital. Its low cost means that it can be used to gather data on a large number of news outlets for a long time span, restricted only by availabilities in digital archives. More importantly, an automatic search is easily replicated, as it is based on known set of words and/or sentences that are used as classi…ers. Perhaps a limitation of this approach is that we only classify articles according to the topic covered, without attempting to code whether their tone is positive or negative. Our focus is therefore exclusively on the agendasetting behavior of newspapers, not on the framing of issues through an intentional or unintentional choice of words. Coding for tone is di¢ cult, especially when dealing with such a nuanced object as a newspaper article, even using human-based content analysis. Unless the analyst provides detailed instructions, inter-coder reliability typically falls far short of acceptable standards. And when the analyst's instructions are very detailed, then results are likely to be driven by these instructions.
This suggests that coding for the tone using an automated procedure is also likely to be quite di¢ cult. We view it as an important challenge for future research, however, since the replicability of machine-based content analysis constitutes an extremely valuable feature for the scienti…c study of mass media.
Related Literature
The theory of agenda setting is built around the idea that mass media can in ‡uence the importance attached to di¤erent issues by readers and viewers. 2 As Lippmann [1922] notes, news provided by the mass media are a primary source of information about public a¤airs, and sometimes the only one. Beginning with the seminal contribution by McCombs and Shaw [1972] on Chapel Hill voters, a host of empirical studies have searched for the presence of agenda-setting e¤ects, i.e. of a causal relationship that goes from the coverage of issues on the mass media to the priorities of the public.
Experimental evidence, such as that provided by Iyengar, Kinder and Peters [1982] , lends the strongest support to this hypothesis. Importantly, the choice of the topics covered by the media need not be politically neutral. There are several ways that media sources can try to use their agenda-setting power to favor one political party or the other.
One way is to exploit the fact that citizens often think that given problems are better handled by one of the parties. This is the notion of "issue ownership", as introduced by Petrocik [1996] , who found that on some issues a majority of citizens consistently perceives one party to be more competent than the other. These are the so called "owned issues". For example, U.S. citizens on average believe that the Democratic Party is more competent at managing problems related to welfare and civil rights, while the Republicans are perceived as more competent on defense. 3 In some cases citizens lack consistent opinions about which party is better at handling a given problem, but they can update their beliefs on the basis of the past and current performance of the incumbent government with respect to that problem. The economy is a primary example of a "performance issue". News about the economy are good news for the incumbent government if the economy is going well, and bad news if the economy is going badly.
If mass media outlets have political preferences and can in ‡uence the agenda, then there should be a consistent relationship between the preferences of the outlets and the way economic issues 2 For more detailed surveys about the literature on agenda-setting e¤ects, see Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller [1980] are covered, as a function of the true economic datum and the "match" between these preferences and the political a¢ liation of the incumbent administration. From this perspective, our empirical exercise provides a test of whether newspapers cover economic news in a manner consistent with the agenda setting hypothesis and with the existence of di¤erences in their political orientation.
Our paper is also related to the growing empirical literature analyzing the political biases of the mass media in the United States.
Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006] use panel data to study the political orientation of endorsements of U.S. newspapers. They …nd that, while in the 40s and in the 50s Republican candidates received more endorsements, this advantage has constantly declined in subsequent decades:
in the 90s the authors …nd a slight Democrats'lead (10%) in the average endorsement choice. They also …nd an upward trend in the average propensity to provide endorsement for candidates already in o¢ ce. In the 1940s incumbent candidates received 60% of the total endorsements, but this …gure has increased to about 90% today. To sum up, our paper shares with Groseclose and Milyo [2005] and Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] the focus on relative rather than absolute political positions of U.S. media outlets and with Lott and Hassett [2004] the focus on economic news. However, it is the only paper that analyzes the agenda setting behavior of media outlets. 5 On a methodological ground, ours is the …rst paper that combines machine-based replicable data on news with information on explicit endorsement patterns.
Data and empirical strategy
We collected data from the NewsLibrary electronic archive, recording the monthly number of hits on unemployment and in ‡ation, and the quarterly number of hits on the federal budget de…cit and the trade de…cit. 6 First, through a number of preliminary searches we de…ned the exact wording of the search strings in order to reduce the number of false positive and false negative hits. Once identi…ed the appropriate keywords (reported in Table 1 ), we run an automated search, then retrieving the number of hits on each topic by time unit. Overall, we collected data on 140 U.S. newspapers for which electronic archives dating back to 1996 are available to be searched through NewsLibrary.
In this section we will …rst illustrate the procedure used to recover the endorsement propensity of the various newspapers. We will then present the economic news data and a two-stage preliminary investigation of the data. This illustrates our empirical strategy, although in a less rigorous fashion.
We will then be ready to present our panel speci…cation. 4 The latter e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. However, it is not possible to reject at ordinary con…dence levels the null hypothesis that the e¤ects of the two treatment groups on the probability of voting Democrat are equal. 5 The only exception is Puglisi (2006) , who analyses the agenda-setting behavior of the New York Times. 6 The o¢ cial macroeconomic …gure is made available to the public monthly for the unemployment and the in ‡ation rate, and quarterly for the two de…cits.
The endorsement data
We were able to gather endorsement data for 102 newspapers. Table A1 lists the newspapers with endorsement data, together with the chain to which they belong, if any.
We obtained the endorsement data for 85 newspapers from Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006] , and supplemented this with data on 17 additional newspapers searched via the NewsLibrary archive. For the remaining 38 newspapers, in some cases the newspaper has an explicit policy not to endorse candidates for political o¢ ces (e.g. the Deseret News in Salt Lake City, the Orange County Register, and the Colorado Springs Gazette). In addition, many smaller ones do not bother to make endorsements, even though they may not take an explicit editorial stance on the subject.
Following Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006] we can calculate the propensity of each newspaper to endorse one of the parties during electoral campaigns. We used a linear regression model to estimate the "partisan bias" in endorsement behavior. Let i index o¢ ces, let j index newspapers and let t index years. Let
1 if newspaper j endorses Democrat for o¢ ce i in year t 1 if newspaper j endorses Republican for o¢ ce i in year t 0 if newspaper j makes no endorsement for o¢ ce i in year t measure the endorsement behavior by each newspaper that makes an endorsement (or an explicit refusal to endorse) in a race. 7 Also, let
1 if Democrat for o¢ ce i in year t is only incumbent 1 if Republican for o¢ ce i in year t is only incumbent 0 if otherwise measure the incumbency status of the candidates in each race. 8 Finally, we use previous electoral experience to measure non-incumbent quality. Speci…cally, de…ne a "high-quality" candidate as a candidate who currently holds a U.S. House seat or an elected statewide o¢ ce other than the o¢ ce 7 There are a few cases in our sample where a newspaper endorsed both candidates in a race. We drop these from our analysis. 8 After redistricting there are some U.S. House races with two incumbents running, in which case Iijt = 0. There are a few such cases in our sample. If we drop them the results are unchanged. 
The newspaper-speci…c …xed e¤ects, N E j , capture newspapers' partisanship. 10 The question we address is now whether partisanship is only limited to endorsements or rather, in a less transparent way, it is re ‡ected in the coverage of economic news in an agenda-setting fashion. To do this we need to compare newspapers' coverage of given issues with the actual statistical …gures on in ‡ation, unemployment, budget de…cit and trade de…cit. 9 The panel is unbalanced, since we do not have endorsement data on some newspapers in the earlier years. 1 0 The model also includes year …xed-e¤ects, t, to capture partisan tides.
The economic news data: a preliminary investigation
The key variables in our analysis are the values of the four underlying economic indicators, and the amount of newspaper coverage devoted to the four economic issues. Since newspapers vary greatly in size cross-sectionally (total number of pages, stories, and words), and can also vary in size over time, we focus on the relative frequency of stories in each newspaper. Table 1 reports the keywords that we use 11 .
Let EV i t be the value of the economic …gure regarding issue i at time t, where i 2 fU; I; B; T g and U stands for "unemployment", I for "in ‡ation", B for budget de…cit, and T for trade de…cit.
Let n i jt be the relative frequency of pieces published by newspaper j during time t about issue i. 12 In order to take into account the di¤erences in the average amount of coverage devoted to economic news by the various newspapers, we normalize the relative frequency of stories in newspaper j on issue i at time t by subtracting the average relative frequency of stories in that newspaper,
i.e. we consider
For each newspaper j and each economic issue i 2 fU; I; B; T g, we then run a separate OLS regression:
where DP t is a dummy variable indicating that the incumbent president is a Democrat. In addition, we control for a linear time trend and for the logarithm of the total number of articles in each newspaper at time t, s jt . The coe¢ cient However, this relationship is statistically insigni…cant (t-value = 0.49). Figure 5 represents the same relationship for the coverage of the budget de…cit. In this case the estimated slope is negative and statistically insigni…cant (t-value = 1.24). Finally Figure 6 shows the results for the trade de…cit, and shows a mildly negative but statistically insigni…cant relationship (t-value = 0.32) between the estimated interaction terms and the endorsement variable.
Panel speci…cation
This simple two-stage graphical analysis gives a mixed picture of the link between endorsement policy and coverage of economic news. On one hand we …nd some evidence of a partisan bias in the amount of coverage devoted to unemployment. On the other hand, we …nd small and statistically insigni…cant relationships for in ‡ation, the budget and the trade de…cit.
Here, we perform a more structured test. Rather than analyzing newspapers one at a time,
we exploit fully the panel nature of our data. We will therefore estimate three-way speci…cations containing an interaction term between the economic variable EV i , an indicator for Democratic president DP t and the newspaper-speci…c endorsement propensity d N E j 14 . A basic three-way speci…cation is the following (we omit the indicator i of the economic issue): 15
where we include newspaper …xed e¤ects j , newspaper-speci…c trends j and a newspaper-speci…c sensitivity to newspaper size (in logarithm) j . Our coe¢ cient of interest is . A negative value of implies that newspapers which tend to endorse Democratic candidates have a relatively proDemocratic agenda-setting bias (on economic item i), compared to newspapers that tend to endorse
Republican candidates. In this speci…cation we cannot include time speci…c dummies since we have other variables that, in each given period, do not vary across newspapers. However, time dummies can be quite important in order to capture the in ‡uence that contemporaneous events can have on the space devoted to economic news. Hence, in a second speci…cation we include time-dummies t but exclude other variables that, in each period, do not vary across newspapers:
Finally, in our most demanding speci…cation, we replace (
respectively, newspaper-speci…c Democratic president e¤ects and newspaper-speci…c issue-variable e¤ects:
This speci…cation is the most general since we allow newspapers to react di¤erently to changes in the president and in the unemployment rate not just in function of their endorsement partisanship but also of any other unobserved newspaper characteristics.
Since it is a priori unclear which aspect of an economic …gure is deemed as more newsworthy by editors and journalists (whether it is the level thereof, or the change, or both), we also re-consider the same three speci…cations by using the change in the relevant economic …gure rather than the levels in the interaction terms. In this case we keep the level of the economic variable as a control.
We …nd, however, no signi…cant results when we focus on changes. The tables are therefore not reported but are available from the authors upon request. Table 3 displays the results about unemployment, in ‡ation, budget de…cit and trade de…cit respectively. We report t-statistics in brackets below each coe¢ cient.
Results
The results in Table 3 con…rm that newspapers with a pro-Democratic-endorsement pattern, compared to pro-Republican newspapers, give less coverage to unemployment in times of high unemployment under Clinton than under George W. Bush. The three-way interaction between the level of the unemployment rate, the Democratic President dummy and the Democratic endorsement variable always comes with the expected negative sign and is signi…cant at the 5% level in all three speci…cations. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is also very stable across speci…cations. We …nd, however, no comparable e¤ect for any of the other economic variables we consider. For in ‡ation, budget de…cit and trade de…cit the three-way interaction is always very far from any acceptable signi…cance level and therefore statistically indistinguishable from zero.
To calculate the magnitude of the e¤ect for unemployment news we group the newspapers into quantiles on the basis of their endorsement patterns. Then, for each group, we compute the di¤erence between the average predicted change in the number of unemployment stories under
Clinton and under George Bush Jr., if the unemployment rate is one percentage point higher than the average. The magnitudes refer to newspapers belonging to the …rst, third and …fth quintile in the endorsement distribution, i.e. newspapers that we de…ne as, respectively, strongly Republican, "neutral," and strongly Democratic. The estimated e¤ects are not trivial. Newspapers will react to a 1% increase in the unemployment rate di¤erently depending on whether the president is Democratric or Republican: under a Democratic president a strongly Republican newspaper will provide 15% more news on unemployment than if the same 1% increase in the unemployment rate happens under a Republican president. On the other side, considering again a 1% increase in the unemployment rate, a strongly Democratic newspaper will provide 9% less news on unemployment under a Democratic president than under a Republican president. The di¤erential treatment of the same change under the two presidents is instead limited to 1% for a "neutral" newspaper.
Some data analysts might be tempted to treat the average di¤erence in slopes across Democratic and Republican presidents (the s) as a measure of the average absolute level of bias across the newspapers in our sample. We are not. The reason is that the time sample is too short, so we are only comparing two presidents; the underlying economic conditions were di¤erent under the two presidents, so functional form is a major concern; and many other newsworthy events it is interesting to note that the coe¢ cients on the interaction between the unemployment rate and the endorsement variable (the #s) are positive and statistically signi…cant. In other terms, coverage by Democratic-endorsing newspapers is more reactive to high unemployment than by
Republican-leaning ones, even when controlling with the triple interaction for the partisan e¤ect.
Robustness checks
In this section we check the robustness of our results. We implemented a number of checks for all the economic variables considered and we noticed no change in our conclusion regarding in ‡ation, budget de…cit and trade de…cit: there is no noticeable statistically signi…cant bias in the covering of these issues. In this section, therefore, we only report results that concern unemployment, the only economic variable on which we found agenda setting behavior by part of the newspapers.
Lagged values of the economic …gures
It is a priori unclear whether newsworthy economic events are more correlated with contemporane- The …rst three columns of Tab. 4 parallel the …rst three columns of Table 3 but use lagged instead of contemporary unemployment. The results previously obtained are all con…rmed and the magnitudes are also very similar (slightly larger under speci…cations A and B, slightly smaller using speci…cation C). The R-squared also show that the overall …t is comparable in the two cases.
Controlling for state-level unemployment
Newspapers typically have a locally concentrated readership that cares about local events, and local aspects of common phenomena. Since there is noticeable variation in unemployment across regions and states, the local unemployment rate in an area or state may represent a newsworthy issue. This can potentially introduce an omitted variables bias. The concern is that, in Democraticvoting areas, the local unemployment rate could be systematically lower than its average when the incumbent president is a Democrat, because of public job-creating projects being targeted to the area. If the political partisanship of potential readers in the area where a newspaper sells is positively correlated with its endorsement policy, then the less intense coverage of high unemployment by Democratic-leaning newspapers under a Democratic president could be driven by the fact that the local unemployment rate is lower in those areas where the newspapers are sold. This would not indicate a partisan bias trickling down from the editorial page to the economic news section, but simple reporting on local economic conditions.
To address this issue, we re-ran our regressions controlling for both the level and change of the unemployment rate in the state where each newspaper is based 17 . The results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 4 . Again we …nd a systematic correlation between the endorsement policy and the di¤erential coverage of unemployment. The size and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of the three-way interaction terms are very similar to those reported in Table 3 . The coe¢ cients of the level of the unemployment rate in the state is positive and signi…cant at standard con…dence levels.
Similarly, the coverage of unemployment is positively and signi…cantly correlated with the change in the state unemployment rate. Consequently, we will keep state unemployment levels and variations as control variables in the next checks.
Excluding editorials
The results found so far could be driven by what is featured on editorial pages themselves. Therefore we repeat our regressions by excluding editorials from our dependent variable. 18 The results are presented in columns 7-9 of Table 4 , again using the same A-B-C speci…cations and including levels and changes in state unemployment rates. The results are very reassuring: the coe¢ cient of the three-way interaction is again negative and signi…cant, the magnitude is only slightly inferior to what we found in the previous cases. To sum up, a large part of the di¤erential coverage of unemployment takes place on the news pages, not merely on the editorial ones, suggesting that agenda-setting indeed spills over into the economic news section.
Chain-based and large newspapers
Given that we rely on electronic archives, there is a trade o¤ between the length of the time span
we can study and the number of newspapers for which data are available. For the period 1996-2005 we can rely on 102 newspapers but this number shrinks rapidly as we extend backward the period 1 7 Because of multicollinearity problems, while the slope of unemployment news with respect to the national unemployment rate is allowed to be newspaper-speci…c, the slopes with respect to state level unemployment rate and its change are common across newspapers. 1 8 We consider news on unemployment excluding the words "editorial" or "editor". To pin down the size of the news section of each newspaper during each month, we have run a search on the word "and", excluding again the words "editorial" or "editor".
we consider. Using di¤erent time windows, our results turn out not to be always robust: 19 however, we cannot say whether this is due to the usage of a di¤erent sample of newspapers or rather to features speci…c to the period considered. Hence, to mantain some consistency across periods, we explore the robustness of our results for the subsample of large-scale newspapers, i.e. those that sell a large number of copies (above 200,000 copies per day on average in 1996) and/or belong to large chains. 20 It could be the case that managing editors and journalists of large-scale newspapers are more conscious of the political facets of their agenda setting behavior, and act accordingly. In other terms, the relationship between the endorsement policy and the coverage of economic news might be less noisy (and hence less susceptible to sample size) when restricting our attention to this subset of newspapers. Table 3 . This reduction is even stronger for the period 1992-2005. On the contrary, when we consider the 1996-2005 period, the coe¢ cient turns out to be substantially larger for chain-based and large newspapers (columns 7-9 in Table   5 ) than for the whole sample (columns 1-3 in Table 3 ). In brief, although the magnitudes of the relevant coe¢ cient may vary by a relevant amount, Table 5 substantially con…rms all the results we found in the previous regressions.
Demand-driven coverage?
Gentzkow and Shapiro's [2007] thorough analysis of language similarity between congressmen and U.S. newspapers suggests that the ideological position of the latter is strongly correlated with the political leaning of their readers. On the other hand, once geographical factors are taken into account, the owner's identity has very little or no explanatory power on the political leaning of a 1 9 The statistical signi…cance of the three-way interaction coe¢ cient disappears if we consider the period 1992-2005 but reappears at the 5% level for the period 1988-2005. Moreover, regarding the 1992-2005 period, if one excludes the Washington Times and/or the Manchester Union-Leader from the sample, the triple interaction comes out strongly signi…cant again. One should notice here that in our sample the Washington Times is the most extreme newspaper endorsement-wise. Moreover, the Union-Leader, a decidedly Republican paper, is the only one based in New Hampshire, which in 1992 was hit by the worst depression of the last forty years.
2 0 Details are provided in Table A1. given newspaper.
In the previous sections we have investigated whether the explicit political position of a newspaper, as proxied by its endorsement choices, trickles down from the editorial to the news section, in ‡uencing the coverage of economic news. One might be concerned that editors tune their endorsement choices to the ideological leaning of readers, so that our endorsement variable is merely proxying for a demand factor which also determines economic coverage. According to this view, both endorsement choices and the partisan coverage of economic news are determined by what customers would like to read, with no independent role for the newspaper's editorial position, i.e. a supply factor.
In order to address this concern we proceed as follows. First, as a proxy for the average political position of readers of a given newspaper j, we weight the average Democratic vote in presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial elections in each county during the time period by the relative sales of that newspaper in that county. Let this variable be N R j . We then replicate our three baseline speci…cations by replacing the endorsement variable d N E j with the readership variable N R j . For all three speci…cations, we also consider an extended model where we include both d N E j and N R j , properly interacted with the Democratic President dummy DP t and the level EV t of the economic variable. Table 6 displays results for the contemporaneous unemployment rate. 21 When not controlling for the endorsement behavior the coe¢ cient on the triple interaction between the unemployment rate, the Democratic President dummy and the voter partisanship variable is negative and statistically signi…cant. This signi…cance is lower (and absent in one case) when introducing back the endorsement controls. On the other hand, the triple interaction with the endorsement variable remains negative and statistically signi…cant (mildly so with speci…cations B and C) even after controlling for readers'partisanship. To the extent that the proxy we use is an accurate one, the ideological leaning of readers appears to be signi…cantly correlated with the coverage of economic news, but endorsement partisanship as a supply factor still plays a role.
One simple fact, which indicates that newspapers'editorial stances are not driven entirely by their readers'preferences, is the low correlation between the partisanship of endorsements and that of voters, which is just .21. While positive, and statistically signi…cant (p-value = .031), it is hardly overwhelming. 22 Evidently there is a lot of "slack" between voters and editors.
Since it remains di¢ cult to disentangle the direction of causality with data whose relevant variation is ultimately cross-sectional, a possible empirical strategy consists in using time series Ideally, this anedoctal evidence should be backed up by the analysis of a large sample of newspapers, with enough time series variation in ownership and management. However, coupled with our previous analysis of endorsement patterns, it is indicative of the fact that supply side factors 2 2 One might be concerned that this low correlation is driven by the presence in the sample of newspapers that are based in large cities like Chicago, New York and Los Angeles, where the market is politically segmented. However, if we exclude those newspapers (in our case the Chicago Sun-Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times), the resulting correlation slightly drops to 0.2 (p-value = .045). 2 3 This is formally con…rmed by proper di¤erence-in-di¤erences regressions, available upon request from the authors.
might play a non-negligible role in determining the political position of mass media outlets, in this case a¤ecting the partisan coverage of economic news.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the relationship between the endorsement policy of U.S. newspapers and the coverage of economic issues, as a function of the true economic datum and the political a¢ liation of the incumbent president. Considering the last decade, there is strong evidence that newspapers endorsing Democratic candidates give less coverage to high unemployment (and more coverage to low unemployment) under Clinton than under George W. Bush, as compared to Republican-leaning newspapers. This relationship is very robust to a number of alternative speci…cations and robustness checks. On the other hand, there is no evidence of a systematic correlation between the endorsement policy and the coverage of in ‡ation, the budget de…cit and the trade de…cit.
These …ndings deserve further explorations. On one side, …nding evidence of agenda setting behavior only on one economic issue out of four could induce us to reject the idea that there is any relevant ideologically slanted agenda setting in economic news on the U.S. press. On the other side, unemployment is, of the four considered, the most salient issue. Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, there is a large body of evidence according to which citizens assess the incumbent president's performance on the basis of how strong the economy is, and vote accordingly in the next presidential elections. Citizens are also better able to grasp the signi…cance of a high unemployment rate, because of the dire consequences this might have on their personal lives.
This latter statement likely applies to the in ‡ation rate as well, but the independence of the Federal Reserve makes harder for the public to establish links between presidential policies and its variation. Also, even if citizens are largely unaware of the institutional independence of the FED, in the time period under consideration in ‡ation was very low 24 , so that it was not perceived as a serious problem policy makers had to tackle. It is also interesting to note that -in the long run analysis of the LA Times presented in section 5.5 -the succession of Otis Chandler as publisher seemed to matter not only with regards to the partisan coverage of unemployment, but for in ‡ation as well. It is indeed the case that, during the longer time period we considered there, the in ‡ation rate was often higher than in the more recent period, sometimes much higher, like in the late 40s, the 70s and the early 80s. At those times the rise in the cost of living was widely perceived as a very serious issue.
Finally, the budget de…cit and the trade de…cit are more arcane variables, whose in ‡uence on presidential approval is far from clear and whose signi…cance citizens understand much less, perhaps because of the lack of direct e¤ects on their personal lives, perhaps because the e¤ects are not immediate and can therefore be heavily discounted. In the American National Election Studies 1992-2004, unemployment came in second as the "most important problem facing the nation"
(crime being …rst). Nearly 10% of respondents mentioned it. By comparison, less than 0.5% of respondents mentioned in ‡ation, and even counting generously, only about 1.5% of respondents mentioned trade issues (only 0.33% of respondents mentioned the trade de…cit speci…cally, and more respondents mentioned "international competitiveness" or "outsourcing", which might be treated more appropriately as employment issues). 25 As mentioned in the introduction, we only study agenda-setting and do not attempt to estimate any framing of economic events done through tone. Another limitation of our approach is that we simply count the number of articles featuring the chosen keywords. 26 Still, our approach to the study of mass media is very ‡exible and easily replicable. This allows to readily extend the dataset and type of analysis in several directions. First, it would be worthwhile to try and gather data on additional newspapers for the early 90s and late 80s, in order to shed some further light on the robustness of our results with respect to the time-window being considered. Moreover, historical electronic archives like ProQuest can be used to construct long time series on the coverage of economic issues by a handful of newspapers. Secondly, any debate on the extent of "mass media bias" in the U.S. should be put into a comparative perspective. 27 Given that the economy represents a salient issue in almost all countries, one could use the same 66 DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is Democratic, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NE is the newspaper endorsement variable. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is Democratic, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NR is the newspaper readership variable, while NE is the newspaper endorsement one. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% reader partisanship reader and endorsement partisanship
